The Indo-US nuclear deal and India’s nuclear deterrent
All of us are rightly spewing indignation and anger at the spineless machinations of India’s politicians regarding the proposed Indo-US nuclear deal. However it is also instructive to take a look at what the technical and strategic issues and their implications are. The issues are admittedly complex, but as I sifted through some of the myriad points, at least for now one of them in particular struck me as important, possibly misleading and slotted to be a key factor in our present and future nuclear policy.
That point concerns nuclear weapons for deterrence. One of the key purposes of the nuclear deal would be to gain access to international uranium stocks, so that our own rather tighly constrained uranium stocks would be free for generating power. This is a sound proposition. However, many experts including some in the Indian atomic energy establishment have admitted that the freed up domestic uranium stocks could be diverted in weapons research and development. Since India is keeping some reactors off limits from IAEA inspection, this possibility seems to be very real. The question naturally arises; do we need more nuclear weapons? Based on what I have read until now, the answer seems to be no, or at the very most, a few.
Even though the exact number is not known, it is safe to assume that India has around 50 nuclear weapons of the fission and fusion type. A report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) did an analysis based on known Indian reactor operating capacities as well as possible amounts of material used by India in its two nuclear tests. The report concludes that India has about 500 kg of weapons-grade plutonium in reserve. This is a huge quantitiy, enough to construct about 100 fission bombs. The bombs could be made even more powerful if they were of the “boosted type” in which a mixture of deuterium and tritium is added to increase the yield through fusion.
Any such number of bombs are more than enough for deterrence in my opinion. Assume a conservative total lower limit of bombs of 100. Further assume conservatively that the average yield of the bombs is 10 kilotons each (for comparison purposes, the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki which killed about 100,000 people instantly were 20 kT each). The question is, are these weapons enough for deterrence? There are many factors which we have to consider in this context, but unless I hear a good argument against it, to me the answer currently seems to be yes. Some comparisons reinforce this conclusion in my mind. At the end of World War 2, when some belligerent and hard-hitting officials in the US administration and military were already thinking about knocking out the Soviets in a possible atomic strike, General Leslie Groves who was head of the Manhattan Project commisioned a study to find out the size of arsenal of bombs necessary to destroy 90% of Russia’s biggest cities and perhaps half of their industrial capability. Even considering the crude Hiroshima type bombs then under construction, experts reached a figure of 200. In the face of this fact, it seems absurd beyond reason that at the end of the Cold War, the US ended up with a legacy of around 10,000 weapons.
Other countries have exercised more caution in the building up of nuclear arsenals. Britain has had a fleet of 200 atomic bombs. It was much closer to the European and Russian mainland, yet it never saw a need for a larger arsenal for deterrence. Who would dare attack them when faced with a retaliation with 200 thermonuclear weapons? It took the French a little more to feel secure; about 400. China probably has 100-200. Israel perhaps has 100. All these countries have felt that these arsenal sizes coupled with efficient delivery vehicles are enough for deterrence, and they are. Even five of these weapons reaching “enemy” soil would have a horrendous effect killing millions. These arsenals were fashioned for deterrence against the Soviet Union and China, countries with huge land areas. Surely a fleet of 100 bombs should serve as a detterent against the much smaller Pakistan for us? Possibly much less will do, say around 50. For China, it will take a little more, but given the statistics quoted above for other countries even during the Cold War, there is no reason to think that any number bigger than 200 would be considered woefully insufficient for deterrence. With an average yield of 10-20kT, these weapons would wreak havoc on any highly populated city, and nobody in their right mind would invite such destruction.
India also has efficient delivery systems. Our latest ICBM Agni 2 has a range of around 2500 km, enough to reach some but not deeper targets in China. The missile can easily carry a 20 kT warhead. Development also continues for the Agni 3, which will have similar delivery capabilities with longer ranges reaching deeper into China.
With such a weapons and delivery capability, there seems no expedient reason for India to divert its precious uranium reserves into weapons even with access to foreign reserves. We need all the uranium and plutonium (and perhaps thorium) to generate electricity. As noted above, we have ample plutonium for weapons. In addition, we also have considerable stocks of reactor-grade plutonium to build a bomb or two per year. Reactor grade plutonium has a much higher percentage of an unfavourable plutonium isotope that causes spontaneous fission. Due to this problem, more of it needs to be used in order to make an efficient weapon, but nevertheless it can be used. This extra source of plutonium for weapons seems to make arguments for diverting uranium into weapons-building even more tenuous.
We don’t know for sure whether the Indo-US nuclear deal will be dead in the face of lack of political will. But even if it is dead, does it mean that nuclear power generation in India should stop? Not for the near future it seems. We are in the process of constructing three to four new reactors including a fast breeder reactor at Kalpakkam. Currently it has been estimated by the IPFM panel that our annual production of uranium is around 300 tons. Annual needs of uranium for power production are 450 tons, so clearly we have been having a deficit and this has been considered a key lacuna in our power generation capability. However, two new mines in Andhra Pradesh will produce about 100-200 tons of extra uranium. There is opposition to the opening of the mines that centers mainly around the legitimate issues of pollution and environmental depletion, but this opposition can be overcome by political will and prudent action. The IPFM report makes it clear that if all eight of India’s unsafeguarded reactors are used for generating power instead of weapons material, the uranium requirement will be about 340 tons, only a little more than what is produced currently, and certainly much less that what we could produce if the two Andhra Pradesh mines would be opened up.
So it seems to me that if we don’t divert uranium for weapons building and if we open up the two new mines, India will have enough uranium for power generation for the next decade or so. As noted above, we already have plutonium for an ample nuclear deterrent. Plutonium from the spent fuel rods generated in the power generation from uranium can also be used for weapons. Given our stocks of plutonium, delivery systems and current arsenal, we seem to already possess the minimum credible deterrent against both Pakistan and China. On the other hand, building more nuclear weapons will clearly send out the wrong message to Pakistan, China and the rest of the world and undermine security in South-Asia for no justifiable reason. They will also unnecessarily sap taxpayers’ money, a point that should not be lost on libertarians. In view of this fact, I believe that if we decide to open new mines and use all the uranium that we can without weapons building, we should have enough nuclear material to increase power generation for at least a few years.
I don’t mean to imply that we will be as better off without the deal as with it, at the least because in addition to material we would have also acquired valuable equipment and technology through it. Eventually uranium deposits will be depleted and any access to foreign uranium stocks will always be beneficial. But just because the nuclear deal is currently flailing does not mean that our nuclear power program should also start instantly failing.
Manasi said
November 6 2007 @ 10:00 pm
You present our power generation capacity very well indeed, and I agree that even if the deal is off it need not imply that our nuclear power program is failing. From what I have been reading it does not seem that people in the right places consider it failing. At best I would interpret it as a concern over impeding the progress of the program, when a good opportunity to fasttrack it exists.
Also even though there is an attraction to expand the weapons program, I seriously doubt if we want to do it. We have the minimum deterrence capacity, and in the worst cases of a nuclear war it is enough to hit China and Pakistan. And I don’t think China is interested in a nuclear war with India,or with anyone for that matter. That leaves Pakistan, which cannot be trusted because of its weird leaders. The real fear, however, with Pakistan is proliferation to non-state actors; which does not justify expanding our nuclear weapons program. If Pakistan’s nukes are to get into the wrong hands, India will definitely not be at the top of the hitlist. And if it is not the first one to be hit, it need not worry as much. Even if it is, I am sure it will not be left alone to fight its ‘war on terror’.
The deal is important for the technology and the uranium it will bring in. But not letting it fail at this point of time is also important because it is something that took years of work to happen. Not just the last couple of years, but all those years of trust and friendship building before that. Trust is fragile in relations, and it cannot be truer in international relations. The interpersonal relationships, the rapport between those involved in the dealings cannot be duplicated after a regime change in both the countries. Such deals are a great deal political will and lesser bureaucratic effort. You can never be sure that the next person that comes in will share the same passion, understanding, relations that have been developed by people involved now. The new ones will come in with their own baggage. Wrecking the deal now will be a whole lot of labor lost, a jolt not just to the program but our relations as well. Of course I do not mean that if the program fails, Indo-US relations fail
Ashutosh said
November 6 2007 @ 10:37 pm
Manasi, very prudent comments. Your point about trust is spot on, and I feel it’s such a big tragedy that the ungainly unseemly sloth that is our coalition government wants to only ensure their power and not think about the nation’s good. As you said, India-US relations will not fail with the deal, but the atmosphere of trust will be damaged and undermined as you said. I really feel ashamed sometimes to think of myself as a citizen of a country ruled by such spineless politicians.
I do hope that we don’t plan to build further weapons. The world does not think so, not surprisingly since we won’t put reactors under IAEA safeguards even if the deal goes through. That makes me think that people in high places are interested in more weapons building. If not, the government should send out a clear signal that the material will not be used for weapons. But it does not seem to be saying that, preferring to remain silent on these matters.
However, I would like to know what you think of the fact that as good as the deal is for us, it does undermine the NPT and send a message of favouritism to the world. Even my friends who agree that India is a responsible nuclear state don’t see the deal as favourable because of these reasons. I myself absolutely agree that through our excellent non-proliferation records we have earned such an agreement, but how do we fit it within the norms of an international framework that will ensure future non-proliferation and prudent nuclear policy?
Manasi said
November 7 2007 @ 4:13 am
I agree to both the views that it is favoritism and undermines the NPT, and that we have earned it with our record. We have so far had a very good record at non-proliferation, have no violations ascribed to us and through our overall international performance earned this deal. And I am sure we will continue to maintain as clean a record for long.
This deal with the US is about nuclear energy for civilian use, energy that we need to keep up with our growth. But then simultaneously there is Iran, a country that is being threatened with war by US if it continues to pursue its “civilian nuclear program”. And there is North Korea that was made to give up its program effectively by the US. I do not think that India and Iran or North Korea can be compared can be compared in terms of their proliferation records or international standing. But those cases make concerns over NPT worse. We are setting an example, creating a justification for others to start their programs. I have no idea how this can be fitted into the international framework that ensures non-proliferation. If anything the deal undermines the efforts of non-proliferation by creating a precedent. We aren’t even a signatory to the NPT and we are being favored. So what value is the NPT? What incentive do you provide countries like Iran to not opt out it, or other non-proliferation agreements? Probably we could sign the NPT once the deal is operationalized. Not sure how much help that step would be tough.
You also mention that you think that people in the right places are interested in developing the weapons program. I would agree given the evidence, but continue to have my doubts. Considering that a dirty bomb is enough to do sufficient harm, I think it is the delivery systems that make a difference and give you that edge.
Ashutosh said
November 7 2007 @ 3:02 pm
One crazy thought I had was, how about we give up our weapons building altogether? I know there would be vehement political opposition to this, but what if we retain our current atomic fleet, continue delivery systems development until there are enough and save our existing Pu for weapons? That should also set a good example to the world and encourage collaboration. The way I see it, you could be right that people in the right place not wanting to actually build weapons or divert resources to them, but they want a “just in case” fallback. In either case I am puzzled.
As for Iran and NK, there may be one possible technical way out to provide them with nuclear energy without allowing for nuclear proliferation. There are new designs for custom made sealed reactors. These reactors are something like our butane cooking gas cylinders in India. You use them for power generation, but any attempt to misuse them will not just make them void, but also would be detected as there is an agreement to return the empty ones after use. This was reported in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (a very useful general read for keeping abreast of nuclear matters). I will send you the reference.
Manasi said
November 7 2007 @ 4:31 pm
Giving up our weapons production completely sounds great, utopian infact. And it will be extremely difficult as you point out.
These cylinder like reactors sound interesting. Do email me the reference, I would love to read it. And if these reactors really a feasible option they could open up a whole new possibility not just for countries in need of additional sources of energy production, but also the nuclear energy industry as a whole. I will look forward to hearing from you and reading about these cylinders.
Ramana Dhara said
November 28 2007 @ 7:19 pm
Ashutosh,
You present a good case for why we dont need more nuclear weapons. My impression is that nuclear power generation in India has always been a cover for weapons production. Given that 25% or more of the science budget is used by the Dept. of Atomic Energy for producing less than 3% of the nation’s power, it is not difficut to figure out where the money is going. With the exception of France, no Western nation has opened a new reactor. The economics simply do not make sense as nuclear power generation is more expensive than thermal power.
2 factors may alter this: climate change, and peak oil. AS we pass peak oil reserves, the cost of thermal power may approach nuclear. It is true that nuclear power has lower CO2 emissions, but the problem is that uranium reserves are also declining, and we have to go to secondary and tertiary sources of mining, which will again drive up the costs of nuclear power generation. I do not believe that either the IPCC or the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists have recommended nuclear power as a solution to climate change, primarily because of the waste problems and potential for proliferation. Even the govt. of India’s own projections of a 10-fold increase in power need by 2050 do not see more than 20-25% of power generation from nuclear sources. Most of the power is going to be from fossil fuel combustion. Imagine what this will do to India’s environment which is already badly damaged. Energy conservation is the only way out here.
India is trying to keep its options open for uranium reserves by going for the nuclear deal. It has to balance this access to uranium against the cost of linking itself with a superpower who may impose many restrictions but whose star may be on the decline.